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Abstract
This paper empirically investigates the effect of fiscal decentralization on public safety, which is
widely taken as an important issue in evaluating the performance of public service. In addition, we
provide evidence to the transmission channels of the decentralization effect. In a decentralized setting,
the fiscal competition between jurisdictions motivates local governments to provide better crime control
service, but as illustrated in this paper, the externality in the prevention of mobile crime can offset
the beneficial effect of jurisdictional competition. Using panel data for the United States from 1990
to 2009, we find the fiscal decentralization generally lowers the crime rate, but the effect is smaller for
mobile crime than immobile crime. The findings provide strong empirical support to our hypothesis
and the underlying mechanism, and the results are robust to various fiscal decentralization measures
and model specifications.
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During the last three decades, fiscal decentralization and local government reform has been at the center
stage of policy experiments, not only for the countries with a traditional tendency of decentralizing, such
as the United States; but also in a large number of developing and transition economies in Africa, Asia and
Latin America (Yusuf, 1999). Fiscal decentralization, as a process to disperse the right of decision-making
in public expenditure from central to the local governments, is widely believed to be an effective tool for
increasing the performance of public expenditure, even though it may carry some risks of obtaining other
desirable objectives for governments, such as income redistribution and macro-economic stability. Such
linkage between government decentralization and the performance of public sector has been much debated
in theoretical and empirical research. By far, a plenty of literature only focus on the economic outcome of
fiscal decentralization, for example, Davoodi and Zou (1998); Xie, Zou, and Davoodi (1999) and Martinez-
Vazquez and McNab (2003) discuss the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth, King and
Ma (2001) studies the linkage between decentralization and inflation. However, fewer papers focus on
the non-economic effect of fiscal decentralization. Current literature only covers fields like education, for
example Nechyba (2003) and Falch and Fischer (2012); Sigman (2007) and Banzhaf and Chupp (2012)
on the environmental federalism and Uchimura and Jutting (2009) on health outcome. To the best of
our knowledge, no previous research investigates the impact of fiscal decentralization on crime control and
public safety, which is a major social and economic issue. The present study investigates this linkage both
in theory and empirics.
Public safety, as a fundamental freedom the government has to ensure1, can be taken as an important
criterion to evaluate the performance of public sector activities. Thus the impact on the public safety,
which is measured by crime rate in this paper, is important in completely evaluating the efficacy of fiscal
decentralization. So the first question to motivate the paper is what the basic facts about the impact of
decentralization on the crime rate are. However, the impact is hard to capture because the conventional
measure suffers from several problems. Therefore, we employ a new measure of fiscal decentralization to
overcome the shortcomings of the traditional index, the preliminary findings are pretty inspiring. The
casual inspection of state-level data from United States suggests a negative relationship between the crime
rate and fiscal decentralization (as shown in Figure 1), the result holds not only for the total crime rate,
but also for violent crime2 and property crime3. However, by looking at the data for North Dakota, we
1The freedom from fear is one of the four fundamental freedoms that people "everywhere in the world" ought to enjoy,
which are proposed by former president in the United States, Franklin D. Roosevelt.
2Violent crimes are defined in the UCR Program as those offenses which involve force or threat of force. It is composed
of four offenses: murder and non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.
3Property crime is a category of crime in which the person who commits the crime seeks to do damage to or derive an
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observe that the relationship is not found in all the states. From Figure 2, the linkage between fiscal
decentralization and violent crime is negative, but the relationship is positive for property crime, and
ambiguous for total crime. So how to explain the empirical findings of the decentralization effect on crime
in theory? That is another question to trigger this paper.
Although hardly any research exists directly related to the topic, there are still a number of papers
in the relevant fields shedding light on it. Two strands of literature are relevant to our work: one is the
literature on fiscal federalism (cf. Oates, 1999); the other is the economics of crime (cf. Becker, 1968).
The literature on fiscal federalism emphasizes that fiscal decentralization promotes the performance of
public services. As stated in Lockwood (2005), the effect of jurisdictional competition has been illustrated
from various perspectives in the theory of fiscal decentralization. The competition for a mobile tax base
on one hand motivates the local governments to improve the performance of public service, on the other
hands could be harmful due to the interjurisdictional externality. The analysis in our paper will mainly
be based on this strand of literature. But since the crime rate is not only determined by the effort of
government, the insights on the nature of crime, which are provided by the economics of crime, also help
us in understanding the impact of fiscal decentralization on crime control. In the latter strand, some
papers on jurisdictional competition and crime reduction are closest to the topic we are interested in.
Marceau (1997) and Pinto (2007) highlight the role that mobility of crime plays in tax competition. Lee
and Pinto (2009) emphasizes the substitution effect between public and private prevention on crime which
may worsen public security due to the jurisdictional competition. Mehay (1977) and Hakim, Ovadia, Sagi,
and Weinblatt (1979) provide evidence of spillover effects of crime prevention to neighboring jurisdictions.
The literature on economics of crime also provides help for the choice of co-variates in our empirical work.
To avoid the omitted variable bias, we choose the control variables mainly based on Moody and Marvell
(2010)4.
Our analysis indicates that fiscal competition between jurisdictions could lower the crime rate, but the
externality in crime prevention might offset the function of competition, especially in the case of mobile
crime prevention. The crimes which are committed both locally and cross-border are defined as mobile
unlawful benefit or interest from another’s property without using force or threat of force. It includes the offenses of burglary,
larceny-theft and motor vehicle theft.
4
The effects of most co-variates on crime have also been empirically studied in the literature of second strand, for instance,
Zimring and Hawkins (1993) and Levitt (1998) on incapacitation; Freeman (1987), Levitt (1997) and Gould, Weinberg, and
Mustard (2002) on unemployment; Marvell and Moody (1994), Levitt (1996) and Tella and Schargrodsky (2004) on the effect
of police on crime reduction.
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crime in this paper, otherwise, the ones are rarely taken cross-border are immobile crime. Apparently not all
kinds of crime are mobile, for example, the murder or rape is rarely committed cross-border in neighboring
jurisdictions. The effect of fiscal decentralization on immobile crime is simply negative in theory, but the
impact is ambiguous on mobile crime, it depends on whether the harmful effect of decentralization due to
the crime control externality could dominate various kinds of the beneficial effects.
In order to empirically test the hypothesis, we employ a sample from 48 states in the United States
for 1990-2009. We measure fiscal decentralization by density of local governments in each state, and
employ a dynamic linear panel data model based on Arellano and Bond (1991) to estimate the effect
of decentralization on the crime rate. The results suggest that fiscal decentralization lowers the crime
rate, both in violent and property crime. The beneficial effect is systematically larger for violent crime
than property crime. In general, as pointed out in Porter (1996), most cross-border crimes are associated
with property crimes. Mehay (1977) and Hakim, Ovadia, Sagi, and Weinblatt (1979) also suggest that
the spillover effects are mostly on property crime, rather than violent crime5. So the different impact on
violent and property crime provides evidence to the hypothesized effect of externality due to mobile crime
control.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our theoretical hypothesis on the impact of decentral-
ization on crime control, Section 3 studies the measure of fiscal decentralization, the empirical specification
and estimation method. Section 4 describes the data, data source and some basic facts. Section 5 provides
the major empirical findings. Section 6 summarizes and concludes the analysis.
2 Theoretical Analysis
This section provides a theoretical underpinning of the linkage between fiscal decentralization and
public safety. In the framework of the current literature on fiscal decentralization, we mainly focus on
the effect of two externalities introduced by fiscal decentralization: fiscal externality and crime control
externality. The fiscal externality refers to the beneficial or harmful impact of tax competition. The crime
control externality is the spillover effect of controlling mobile crime. The two kinds of externalities are
taken as main transmission channels of the impact on the crime rate. Since the deterrence effect is a major
approach to reduce crime, we mainly analyze the function of the decentralization in police expenditure to
illustrate, the decentralization in welfare system will be also shortly illustrated.
5So hereinafter, the mobile crime mostly refers to property crime, and the immobile crime refers to violent crime.
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2.1 Fiscal Externality
Does fiscal decentralization in police expenditure promote public security? Most models in the relevant
literature contend it does even if in different framework. Let us start with the assumption that governments
are revenue-maximizing in a multi-jurisdictional world with mobile capital, fiscal decentralization will lower
the crime rate and improve public safety because of the tax competition. Tax competition could be well
modeled in the Cournot-like competition game. When the monopoly of central government is broken
down, the local government faces the competition from its neighbors. For fear that the tax base flows to
the other jurisdictions, the local government has to lower the tax rate and provide better public service,
that is, to improve the government performance in terms of allocative efficiency and X-efficiency6. Fiscal
decentralization actually can be taken as a process to introduce and intensify tax competition, then the
local governments have to provide better service on public safety in lower cost in a decentralized setting,
so as to ensure the tax base does not to flee to other jurisdictions due to the high crime rate. The mobility
of tax base, in the framework of Brennan and Buchanan (1977), thus can be considered as a positive
externality. It raises the competition for the tax base between jurisdictions, and thus lowers the crime
rate.
Under the assumption that the governments are benevolent, the linkage between decentralization and
crime rate also holds. Although in Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), public expenditure might be at an
inefficiently low level in a decentralized setting, because local governments compete for capital by lowering
their tax rate on capital, yielding a lower level of public service. However, the fear for the outflow of the tax
base can also raise the expenditure to an efficient level. Marceau (1997) demonstrates that, given plausible
assumptions, the threats of criminal behavior to the tax base could motivate the government to raise the
provision of public service to the efficient level or even higher. Assuming the criminals can rob the mobile
tax base, such as capital, the capital or the owner of the capital prefers to move to a safer jurisdiction.
Even for some less mobile tax base, such as property, if the tax is an ad valorem tax, like the case in the
United States, the serious problem of public security would drive the investors off and lower the price of
the property. It could be also taken as an outflow of the tax base. In either case, the local governments
have to raise public spending, at least on public safety issues, in order to ensure its own tax base in such
a competition. Therefore, as a process to introduce tax competition, the fiscal decentralization creates
an incentive for local government to reduce crime7. Moreover, Besley (1995) illustrates the importance of
6The improvement in allocative efficiency is defined as the adjustment in structure of public expenditure towards the
optimal allocative condition. Given the expenditure to each kind of public project, the improvement in the performance of
public service can be taken as an increase in X-efficiency.
7In other words, assume the tax rate and the spending on public safety can be efficiently offered by central government, then
in a decentralized setting, the provision by each local governments will be also efficient. Otherwise, if one local government
lowers the tax rate to compete for tax base, the tax base actually will not flow to the jurisdiction due to the worse safety
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property rights protection to facilitate investment. By increasing its effort in deterrence, a jurisdiction can
attract investments that would otherwise locate in other jurisdictions, so the government has a motivation
to set the public expenditure on safety issue to the level even higher than efficient in the tax competition.
Keen and Marchand (1997) show that, for fear of capital flowing to neighboring jurisdictions, the local
government might even distort the structure of public expenditure. More expenditure goes to the capital-
related public service, so that too little is spent on other projects. So in a decentralized setting, if the
main source of revenue for local government is the property or capital tax, as is the case in the United
States8, the local government may spend more on policing or other projects on crime control, in order to
prevent the outflow of the tax base or attract investors.
As a brief summary, the mobility of the tax base creates a positive fiscal externality, which pushes
the local government to raise its public spending on safety issue in a competition for tax base. Fiscal
decentralization introduces or intensifies tax competition, so that lowers the crime rate. However, since
capital is not only sensitive to crime, but also the tax rate, it is less likely to impose a much higher tax
rate in the decentralized setting than in a centralized one. According to Qian and Roland (1998), the
competition for capital can also motivate governments to reduce their corruption, waste, or other kinds
of X-inefficiency, in order to provide more public services. So in practice, it is more possible for the
government to promote public safety by raising the X-efficiency of public spending rather than expanding
its size.
Similar to the case of fiscal externality in the decentralization of police expenditure, jurisdictional
competition will also affect the size and efficiency of the public spending on welfare projects. For fear that
the tax base flows to safer jurisdictions, local governments have to improve their public service on welfare
projects. Therefore, total crime is expected to be lower and public safety could be promoted.
2.2 Crime Control Externality
In addition to fiscal externality, the mobility of crime creates other kinds of externalities which can also
affect the public service on the control of crime, in particular, the cross-border crime. As illustrated above,
the mobility of crime here is defined as the feasibility or possibility of a crime to be committed cross-border
in neighboring jurisdictions. So the mobile crimes are the ones which can be easily committed both locally
and cross-border, and the immobile crimes are local in nature. Although the theory on offender mobility
situation, who is reluctant to move to a jurisdiction in which the welfare cannot be optimized to efficient level? Hence, without
the flow of tax base and tax competition, the spending on crime control in each local government will be still efficient, and
won’t be lowered due to the fiscal decentralization. The main difference between here and Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986)
is that, the low tax rate can lead to the loss of tax base, so the flow of tax base is not beneficial to the owners.
8In the United States, the main tax collected by local governments is property tax, which is imposed on real estate or
other kinds of properties.
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and target selection suggests, according to Padhy (2006), the distances traveled by offenders from homes
to crime sites won’t be very long, the criminals still may avoid targets adjacent to their homes to avoid
being easily recognized and arrested. Especially, based on Morselli and Royer (2008), greater distances
traveled for crime are generally associated with higher criminal earnings. Therefore, the property crimes
are easier to be committed cross-border than violent crimes, the conclusion is in line with the finding of
Porter (1996), most cross-border crimes are property-related. Also according to Porter (1996), the cross-
border crimes don’t rarely happen, based on three large scale surveys in UK, 10% of detected crimes are
cross border in nature, most are property crime.
Due to the mobility of the cross-border crime, the policy on crime control can generate spillover effect
between jurisdictions. If the government of a local jurisdiction provides better public service on police,
no matter through expanding expenditure or raising X-efficiency, the mobile crime rate would be lower
for two reasons: first, a criminal deterred from committing a crime in this jurisdiction may simply change
to commit it in another, that is, the displacement effect or spillover effect; second, more criminals are
captured or stop committing crimes for fear of being arrested. Due to the first effect, the crime rate of
neighboring jurisdiction will be increased. In Pinto (2007), the author takes the displacement effect as an
incentive for the local government to control crime. That is, if a jurisdiction improves the public safety
service, the others have to follow up. Otherwise more criminals, especially those who commit mobile
crimes, will flow to the jurisdictions with lower expenditure or efficiency, then worsen the public safety
further. So in equilibrium, the externality of mobile crime creates a jurisdictional competition of crime
control, the performance of each jurisdiction in public safety thus has to be improved, especially on the
mobile crime control. Since the fiscal decentralization aggravates the crime control competition, the mobile
crime rate could be accordingly lower. However, the mobility of crime does not only lead to a beneficial
externality, but also a harmful one. The second effect would cause the free riding problem. Since the
mobile criminals are the threats to the public safety of all the local jurisdictions, the more criminals are
captured or deterred, the lower the crime rates are in all the jurisdictions. However, in a decentralized
setting, if all the local governments expect the crime control activities of neighbors could reduce mobile
crime in their own territory, they will be intended to lower their own expenditure or efficiency on mobile
crime control. In equilibrium, the government performance on public safety will be worse, and the crime
rate would be risen.
Another kind of harmful externality is the cost inefficiency in controlling the mobile criminals. For
reducing mobile crime, such as vehicle theft, burglary and larceny, the central government has cost ad-
vantage. Assuming each local government has to spend k to capture mobile criminals, even the ones
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who move to other jurisdictions, and deter the people who possibly take up illegal behaviors in its own
territory. However, if the central government takes up such work, the total cost could be lower than nk,
if there are n local jurisdictions within the federation. It is because the efficiency in information sharing,
organization and coordination could be improved in a centralized regime. The redundant projects or fixed
cost each local government has to spend also can be reduced, so that the waste in crime control can be
minimized. However, such cost advantage for central government indicates the cost of mobile crime control
for each local government is too high. The decentralized project of public safety makes the coordination
in information about crime difficult9, and creates barriers to the cooperation in legal actions. So in a
decentralized setting, the local governments prefer to spend more on immobile crime reduction, or other
alternative projects. The mobile crime thus might be higher after police decentralization.
Therefore, unlike the case of immobile crime, the impact of fiscal decentralization is not necessarily
beneficial, but also has its “dark” side to the mobile crime control. The spillover effect of mobile crime
could motivate the local governments to provide better police service in a decentralized setting, but also
demotivate the crime control due to the problem of free riding and cost inefficiency. So in total, the effect
of fiscal decentralization is ambiguous to the mobile crime control.
Close to the case of police expenditure, welfare expenditure also has free riding problem. If the welfare
expenditure in a neighboring jurisdiction is beneficial in reducing mobile crime by increasing the expected
opportunity cost of the criminals, the local government may have less motivation to pay money or effort
on welfare projects. Then in equilibrium, welfare expenditures would be lower. Since the welfare projects
are difficult to be specific to certain kind of criminals, the total crime would be accordingly increased, but
the different effects on mobile and immobile crime are hard to be observed.
2.3 Hypothesis
All in all, the fiscal externality provides incentive for the local governments to reduce crime, both mobile
and immobile crime. However, the effect of the crime control externality is ambiguous, it both provides
the incentive and disincentive to the control of crime, particularly mobile crime. Thus we hypothesize:
HYPOTHESIS: The effect of decentralization on total crime is ambiguous, the fiscal externality reduces
the crime rate, whereas the crime control externality might raise it. More specifically
(a) Decentralization decreases the rate of immobile crime because only fiscal externality matters.
(b) The ambiguous effect on mobile crime is depending on how much the harmful effect of
decentralization due to the crime control externality can offset the beneficial effect.
9Therefore, it is difficult to spot patterns and crime sprees committed by the same offender over multi-jurisdictions.
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In the empirical study, we aim to estimate the effect of fiscal decentralization on total crime, property
crime, violent crime as well as several sub-categories of crime, and see if there is any evidence to our
hypothesis. The transmission channel is another interest in this paper. The different patterns of impact
on violent crime and property crime can help us to explore and measure the effects of the fiscal externality
and the crime control externality, respectively.
For immobile crime, there is no crime control externality to offset the function of jurisdictional compe-
tition, the fiscal externality effect is isolated, and thus can be identified by the impact of police decentral-
ization on immobile crime. Therefore, if immobile crime is reduced by decentralization, the effect of the
fiscal externality is proved empirically, otherwise, the effect at least cannot be captured by our estimation.
In contrast, the crime control externality can only affect mobile crime, so the effect of such an externality
could be identified by comparing the impact of police decentralization on immobile and mobile crime. If
the effect of fiscal decentralization is significantly different between the mobile and immobile crime, the
difference in coefficients could be taken as evidence for the effect of the crime control externality.
As illustrated above, most mobile crime are property related, so the coefficients to police decentral-
ization on violent and property crime are crucial here in exploring the transmission channel behind the
impact of decentralization. Moreover, it is worth to mention that our strategy in empirical study cannot
apply to welfare decentralization, since the welfare projects are not specific to certain criminals, at least
the crime control externality cannot be identified by the difference between the impacts on mobile and
immobile crime.
3 Estimation Strategy
3.1 Measuring Fiscal Decentralization
The conventional measure of fiscal decentralization in the literature is the share of sub-national gov-






local expenditure+ state expenditure
(1)
where T in subscript stands for the traditional measure10. However, the measure is not appropriate
to employ in this context for three reasons. First, as pointed out in Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003)
and Frey and Luechinger (2004), there are two dimensions of fiscal decentralization: “policy implemen-
10Sometimes this measure is described in terms of revenue.
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tation” and “political decision-making”11. The traditional measure can only capture the decentralization
in actual government spending/revenue, that is, with the rise in FisDecT , a larger share of government
expenditure/revenue is raised by local governments. But fiscal autonomy cannot be well measured if local
governments have a few autonomous revenue sources or freedom to decide how to allocate its spending12.
Another disadvantage of the conventional measure is the potential endogeneity problem, which com-
monly occurs in the literature on fiscal decentralization. In the postwar period, the aim of decentralizing
the fiscal system for the government is very possible to be promoting the efficiency of public service, espe-
cially in the countries with a traditional tendency of decentralization, such as United States. Therefore,
the degree of decentralization is probably endogenous with the efficiency of public service due to reverse
causality bias. Specifically, it is possible that the purpose of the decentralization in police and welfare
expenditure is to improve the public safety situation, so that the degree of decentralization is endogenous
with the crime rate. If we cannot rule out the possibility, we have to find a new measure, which is more
likely to be exogenous allowing us to measure the effect of fiscal decentralization on crime, otherwise, the
estimation might be inconsistent.
The traditional measure is particularly problematic when we use data for the United States. In this
paper, we will measure the impact of decentralization by the variation in the degree of decentralization
among the 48 states in the United States over 20 years. In the context of the United States, the state gov-
ernments are defined as central governments, then the county and sub-country level governments are local.
However, the impact of decentralization from state to local is biased to be measured by the conventional
index due to the functional division in the U.S. fiscal system. According to Wilson (2011), in the United
States, the sales tax and income tax are collected by state governments, and are mainly used in funding
public welfare projects and the state-level police projects, education and state-level police. The property
tax is collected by local governments and is used to fund the local public services, primarily including local
police expenditure. Due to the functional division, the transfers from state to local, both in welfare and
police expenditure, are relatively trivial. The coefficient to the conventional index, FisDecT , thus mainly
captures the impact of functional division, rather than fiscal decentralization.
In order to avoid the three problems of the traditional measure, we employ a new measure, that is,
government density, to capture the effect of fiscal decentralization on public safety. The basic idea of the
measure is to capture the mergers and splits of sub-county governments13 in the United States. During the
last two decades, there are more than 200 sub-county governments “born” in United States. For example,
11The difference is “the right to act” or “the right to decide”
12The OECD (1999) measure does capture policy autonomy but still fails as the conventional measure in solving endogeneity
and the other relevant problems.
13The sub-county governments are mainly city and town governments.
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in the period from 1992 to 1997, the number of sub-county governments increased from 11 to 12 cities in
Baldwin County in Alabama, that is, one more city was born. The case also applies to Orange County
in California, during 1997 to 2002, the number grows from 31 to 33. Since the number of counties in
the United States hardly changes, the change in number of sub-county governments is mainly from city
split, which could be taken as an extreme case of fiscal decentralization. In this case, the fiscal revenue
and autonomy are purely decentralized from the old city to the new cities . Thus for the time-series data
of each state, the more cities split, the more fiscal capacity to decide and implement are decentralized.
The logic also applies to cross-state data, more local governments in a state indicate more splits of cities
or towns happened already. It means the fiscal capacity on the local level has been decentralized to a
higher degree. Thus the fiscal externality, namely, jurisdictional competition between cities becomes more
intense, because more local governments are involved. The crime control externality may also get severe
due to the more serious problem of “coordination failure”.
Unlike the traditional index, we don’t use the decentralization from the state level government to the
local level to capture the impact on public service. The case we employ is the decentralization on the local
level, that is, the splits of city. In this case, the endogeneity problem is more likely to be avoided, since
the purpose of city split is hard to be crime reduction. The concern for function division is also settled,
because we do not use any data on the decentralization from state to local government. Moreover, since
such an event as the split of a city is large enough to cause the change in various aspects, especially in
the public service, it is very possible to capture the effect of the decentralization by the data on the splits.
Therefore, we use the variation in the number of local governments to explore the effect of decentralization
on public safety. Note that, the cross-state difference in the number of cities or towns may be due to the
size of states. Therefore, in order to ensure the measure is comparable among states, we have to control














The measure captures the density of local government in real terms. Compared to the traditional
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measure, there are several advantages to the new index. First, it measures the impact of fiscal decentral-
ization, rather than functional division. This advantage is particularly important for United States data.
Second, the new measure is more likely to be exogenous, especially in this article, because the division
of sub-county governments is hardly affected by the public safety situation. However, among the three
measures, FisDecL is most likely to be exogenous, since the land size is constant for each state at least
during the last two decades. The FisDecP is also very likely to be exogenous, since the common factors
that can affect the crime rate and population are limited, particularly in the last 20 years in the United
States. Whereas FisDecG is less likely to be exogenous compared to the other two measures, but still can
be referred to as a robustness check.
3.2 Specification and Estimation Method
In the empirical part of this paper, we will explore the impact of fiscal decentralization on the crime
rate built on the framework provided by the current literature on the economics of crime. The specification
of regression is based on Moody and Marvell (2010). Compared with the static model, the dynamic model
could better describe the determinants of criminal behavior. So a Dynamic Linear Panel Data Model is
employed:
yijt = γyijt−1 + β
′xit + µ
′zit + αij + εijt (5)
where j = 1, . . . , J , i = 1, . . . , I and t = 1, . . . , T . Specifically, we estimate the effect of decentralization
in state i at time t on crime j. Our dependent variable y is various levels and categories of crime. Mainly we
focus on total crime (TotCriit), property crime (ProCriit) and violent crime (V ioCriit), as illustrated in
the theory part of this paper, the coefficients in these three regressions are crucial both to estimate the effect
of decentralization on crime, and to test the hypothesized mechanism behind the impact. In order to get
more robust conclusions, some sub-categories of crime will be investigated, such as murder (Murderit),
rape (Rapeit), robbery (Robberyit), burglary (Burglaryit), larceny theft (Larcenyit) and vehicle theft
(Motheftit). In the estimation, we use the logarithm form of the crime rate for two reasons, firstly the
crime rate is bounded by zero, so hardly taken as normally distributed. After the log-transformation,
we could obtain a normal distribution, which is advantageous in estimation to some extent; secondly, the
transformation makes the coefficients more comparable, in the logarithm form, the estimated parameter
measures the effect of variables by percentage rather than absolute value. The number of the property
crime is in general higher than the violent ones, hence it is necessary for us to transform the dependent
variables to a comparable form.
xit is a matrix of variables to measure the degree of fiscal decentralization, and captures the transmission
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channels. The decentralization is mainly measured by FisDecPit, the density of local government in each
state at each year. FisDecLit will not be taken as a major index to measure due to less variation. As
shown in Table 1, the coefficient of variation indicates that, compared to the other two indices, FisDecLit is
probably hard to capture the impact since its variation is too small. FisDecGit will be employed, however,
since it is more likely to be endogenous, we will only consider it in the robustness check. The transmission
channels will be captured by the interaction term FisDecPit × PolExpit and FisDecPit × WelExpit,
where the PolExpit and WelExpit are the total expenditure on police and welfare projects for state i at
time t. The coefficient to the interaction term FisDecPit×PolExpit also can provide key evidence to the
hypothesized effects: competition effect and externality effect.
zit is the matrix of co-variates, which could be mainly divided into two kinds. The first is deterrence
variables, such as prisoners per capita (Prisonerpcit). More prisoners in general means higher pressure of
deterrence and higher expected cost of punishment. Death penalty is supposed to be included, however
Donohue andWolfers (2006) suggests that there is no compelling evidence of a deterrent effect of executions,
particularly in the countries with serious control on the punishment, so the capital punishment is excluded
in the set of co-variates.
The second class of variables is socioeconomic controls, such as income, unemployment rate, poverty,
inequality index, and so on. According to Western (2007), the evidence of effect of inequality on crime is
not compelling, especially in the U.S., some impact of inequality has been offset by welfare policy. So the
inequality (Gini index) is not taken into the specification. Another reason for the exclusion is to avoid the
problem of multi-collinearity, because inequality is somehow correlated with poverty rate. The co-variates
we choose in this class are mainly based on Moody and Marvell (2010), including disposable income per
capita (Incpcit), unemployment rate (Unempit), poverty rate (Povertyit, the share below poverty line).
In general, low-income or unemployed people are more likely to search for illegal opportunity of income.
The people in poverty are not only motivated to commit crime by financial constraints, but also inequality
in society.
Some relevant variables are also taken into the specification, such as education attainment (Eduit, which
is defined as the rate of high school graduate), tax rate (IncTaxit, which is defined as the top marginal
personal income tax rate) and divorce rate (Divorceit). Based on Lochner (2004), the education attainment
raises the opportunity cost of committing crime, so that it lowers the crime rate. In contrast, the income
tax rate, according to Tabbach (2003), worsens the public safety condition because the opportunity cost
of criminal behavior is lowered. The divorce rate mainly measures the malfunctioning of family in social
stability, as pointed out in Caceres-Delpiano and Giolito (2012), it can increase the crime rate through
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various channels. Some other socioeconomic variables can be covered by the fixed effect term αji, if these
variables are time-invariant, at least over a short time span.
A problem that has to be addressed is the endogeneity of police expenditure, PolExpit, due to the
simultaneous causality bias. As we know, police spending can lower the crime rate, but police spending can
be high if the security situation is too bad. Thus the spending on policing is endogenous with the crime rate.
In order to solve the problem, we employ the expenditure on fire protection as the instrumental variable
for police spending. As illustrated in Levitt (2002), factors such as the power of public sector unions,
citizens tastes for government services, affirmative action initiatives or the politician’s desire to provide
spoils might all be expected to jointly influence the expenditures of firefighters and police. Empirically,
changes in the expenditures on police and fire protection within a state are highly correlated. Therefore
the expenditure on fire protection does not depend on crime, but is correlated with police spending. So it
can fulfill the relevance and exogeneity requirements of instrumental variable.
Since the dataset is a short and wide panel (N is large and T is fixed), we could take the difference and
system generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation to fit the dynamic linear panel data model.
In our estimation, we use the difference GMM estimator raised by Arellano and Bond (1991) rather than
system GMM estimator for two main reasons. One is that γ is far less than unity, that is, the autoregressive
process of dependent variable is not too persistent, then the lagged-levels are not weak instruments, so
the estimator is consistent. The other is that the system GMM estimator suffers from the problem of
too many instruments more than the Arellano-Bond estimator. According to Roodman (2009), too many
internal instrument variables (IV) will overfit the endogenous variables, and cause false-positive bias. The
difference GMM estimator employs fewer IVs than the system one.
The moment conditions are created in the first difference form of Eq (5),
4yijt = γ4yijt−1 + β′4xit + µ′4zit +4εijt (6)
The lagged levels of the dependent variable and the first difference of the error term form the main
source of moment conditions, the first difference of strictly exogenous co-variates are also helpful. For
the consistency of the estimation, the two necessary conditions also have to be tested for Arellano-Bond
estimation. The first one is the Sargan test for overidentification. The other is the Arellano-Bond test for
the uncorrelation of error term, if it fails, the moment condition cannot hold.
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4 Data
4.1 Data Source and Descriptive Statistics
Our sample consists of data drawn from various sources, it in general covers 48 states14 in the United
States from 1990 to 2009. The data on government expenditure are from the Bureau of Census in United
States. The crime data are from the Uniform Crime Reports issued by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), The UCR data we use consist of information at the state level for the seven types of crimes that are
considered most important because of their nature or volume among all offenses (Part I offenses). These
felonies are classified into two groups: Violent Crime and Property Crime. Violent crime includes murder,
forcible rape and robbery. Property crime includes burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson.
Since we will employ the fire protection expenditure as the instrument variable to the police expenditure,
we don’t take arson into our consideration, and exclude it from TotCriit and ProCriit as well.
The data on education attainment, unemployment rate, prisoner per capita, tax rate and number of
local government are all from the Bureau of Census in United States. The divorce rate data are from
Center for Divorce Control and Prevention. The data on disposable income and population are from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis. The research suffers a bit from data limitation for some variables. According
to the summary statistics presented in Table A1, the data on fire protection spending, which is crucial
to estimate the effect of police expenditure are not available on 1990, 1991, 2000, 2002, 2006 and 2009.
However, the sample size is still sufficient to support the following empirical studies15.
The summary statistics on contributions are also revealing. From Table A2, FisDecP varies from
0.01 to 2.69, the coefficient of variation indicates that the source of variation is sufficiently rich. We also
calculate the coefficient of variation for each state in Table A5, which has proved that the variation is not
only from the time series, but also the cross section data. The correlation matrix helps us in expecting
some potential problem in the empirical study. The correlations between FisDecP and interaction term
FisDecP × PolExp and FisDecP × WelExp are 0.9731 and 0.9499, respectively. That indicates the
possibility of multi-collinearity in the regression, which might do harm to the efficiency of estimation.
4.2 Preliminary Look at the Data
From the descriptive statistics, the effect of fiscal decentralization on crime is already evident in our
data. Figure 1 suggests that the degree of decentralization is negatively correlated with total crime, violent
14Alaska and Hawaii are excluded.
15The results are robust even if using the dataset established by interpolation.
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and property crime. The fitted line is steeper for the violent crime than property one, which indicates a
larger beneficial effect on violent crime. The result is robust when we eliminate the sample points with a
higher degree of decentralization than unity. Although preliminary, the graph provides the basic answer
to the question we raise in the beginning: the fiscal decentralization can in general promote public safety.
The different patterns of impact on property crime and violent crime also shed light on the transmission
channels. The negative impact of decentralization on violent crime, which is less mobile, indicates the
existence of fiscal externality. The smaller effect on property crime than violent crime provides us the clue
of the crime control externality in the process of decentralization.
Table 2 shows us the difference in crime rates between the groups with high and low degree of decen-
tralization. We employ all the three measures of fiscal decentralization, FisDecP , FisDecG and FisDecL,
the results indicate that, the total crime rate, violent crime rate and property crime rate are all higher in
the group with lower decentralization degree; in contrast, in the sample which is more decentralized, all
kinds of crime are better controlled. It provides further evidence to the beneficial effect of decentralization
on crime control. However, since too many relevant variables have to be controlled, the more complete
and convincing conclusion has to be drawn from the econometric study in the following part.
5 Estimation Results
We have two major aims in our empirical analysis. We begin with exploring the effect of fiscal decen-
tralization on the crime rate and its pattern of impact. In the second sub-section, we will explore and
measure the transmission channels based on the estimation results.
5.1 Effect of Fiscal Decentralization
To explore the effect of fiscal decentralization on the crime rate, we begin with examining the effect
on the total crime rate. Table 3 provides us the estimation results of various specifications. Column 1 is
the specification without co-variate, the coefficient to FisDecPit is significantly positive, but the Arellano-
Bond test suggests that the autocorrelation of the error term cannot be neglected. So the estimation
is possibly inconsistent. Column 2 only includes the co-variates from Moody and Marvell (2010), the
coefficient to FisDecPit turns out to be negative, and significant at the 1% level. The result indicates
that fiscal decentralization in general can improve public safety. However, the estimation also suffers
from the autocorrelation problem in error term, and there might be also an omitted variable bias. As
a result, the coefficients to some co-variates make less sense, for example, the positive coefficient to the
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WelExpit, which is supposed to be negative. Therefore, we include more co-variates to the regression. In
Column 3, the effect of fiscal decentralization is significantly negative, which further confirms the previous
finding in descriptive statistics and preliminary estimation. The coefficient to FisDecPit, -2.7130, could
be interpreted as, a rise in the degree of fiscal decentralization by one unit can lower the total crime rate
by 2.71%. In this regression, both the Arellano-Bond test and Sargan test are passed, and the coefficients
to co-variates are in line with the predictions in theory.
Following the same approach, we investigate the effect of fiscal decentralization on violent crime and
property crime respectively, which are reported in Table 4. The effect of decentralization on property
crime is significantly negative, so is the effect on violent crime. The regressions in Column 3 and 6 take
all the co-variates into consideration, so the Arellano-Bond test and Sargan test for them are also passed.
An interesting pattern has to be noticed is the difference in the decentralization effect on violent and
property crimes. The coefficient in the regression of property crime is -1.9540, the one for violent crime
is -5.5920, which indicates a larger beneficial effect on violent crime. Considering the similar standard
deviation around 0.770, the difference in coefficients is statistically significant.
The pattern is consistent with what we find in Figure 1, and could be well interpreted in our theoretical
framework. The negative effect of fiscal decentralization indicates the beneficial externality, such as fiscal
externality, displacement effect, dominates the harmful externality for both violent crime and property
crime. As illustrated above, the mobility of property crime is in general higher than violent crime, so the
control on property crime causes more harmful externalities than the violent one. Therefore, the beneficial
effect on violent crime is larger than the property crime16.
In the next step, we distinguish the impacts of the decentralization through raising X-efficiency from
other channels by adding interaction terms into the specification. Table 5 reports the estimation results,
Column 1 examines the effect on total crime rate, the coefficient to FisDecP is negative and significant in
1% level. The coefficient to PolExp×FisDecP is also negative, but the coefficient to WelExp×FisDecP
is insignificant. To interpret the regression results of coefficients, we would better transform the interaction
term and level terms
β1FisDecPit + β2PolExpit + β3PolExpit × FisDecPit (7)
into the form as
β1FisDecPit + (β2 + β3FisDecPit)× PolExpit (8)
16As a robustness check, we apply the specification in Table 4 to six sub-categories of crime. The results, which are reported
in Table A4, generally support the conclusions drawn from Table 4, although the significance is weaker. The beneficial effect
of fiscal decentralization is generally larger for violent crime than property one.
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β3 indicates the effect of fiscal decentralization on crime rate by changing the effect of police expenditure.
That is, given the amount of police spending, the fiscal decentralization can change its impact on crime
reduction. Through this channel, fiscal decentralization could affect the crime rate even if the size of
expenditure does not change. We could take it as a rise (or fall) in the X-efficiency of public spending on
the police system17. Furthermore, β1 measures the effect of fiscal decentralization on crime through other
channels, mainly raising the expenditure on welfare and police projects.
As the variable of our primary interest, Table 5 reports a negative coefficient to the interaction term
PolExpit × FisDecPit, which indicates the rise in the X-efficiency of police expenditure in the process of
fiscal decentralization. The decentralization effect through other channels is also negative and significant.
But the coefficient to WelExpit × FisDecPit is not significant, it indicates a less significant improvement
in the X-efficiency of welfare expenditure. The results can be interpreted by our theory. The beneficial
externality dominates the harmful one, such as cost inefficiency and the free riding problem, in police
decentralization, so that raises the X-efficiency of police expenditure and lowers the crime rate in total.
The competition effect also prevails in other channels, mainly through raising the expenditure on welfare
and police projects, thus the coefficient to level term FisDecPit is significantly negative. However, the
beneficial effect of welfare decentralization has been offset.
The results for property crime and violent crime are reported in Column 2 and 3 of Table 5. For
property crime, the coefficients to all the variables we are most interested in are negative, but the one for
the level term FisDecPit is insignificant. The estimation indicates that fiscal decentralization improves the
property crime control mainly through raising the X-efficiency of welfare and police expenditure, rather
than other channels. For violent crime, the coefficients to FisDecPit and FisDecPit × PolExpit are
negative and significant for violent crime, but the coefficient is insignificant to FisDecPit×WelExpit. So
the decentralization plays its impact largely through raising the X-efficiency of police service and some
channels like expanding expenditure on public safety projects. But the X-efficiency of welfare spending in
reducing crime is not strongly improved by the decentralization.
The difference in the pattern of impact between violent crime and property crime is still significant for
FisDecPit and FisDecPit×PolExpit, which can be explained by the harmful externality of mobile crime
control. In contrast, the different patterns cannot be observed for the welfare decentralization, at least for
the interaction term FisDecPit ×WelExpit. It is also reasonable because the welfare spending is hard to
be very specific to certain kinds of crime, then the effect of welfare decentralization might be not larger
17
The approach of interpretation also applies to the case of welfare decentralization.
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for violent crime than property crime.
However, as illustrated in last section, there might be a problem of multi-collinearity in the regression
with the three terms: FisDecPit, FisDecPit × PolExpit, FisDecPit ×WelExpit, since they are highly
correlated. Therefore, in Table 6, we report the estimation results of regression with only interaction
term18. After tackling the problem of multi-collinearity, most of the coefficients becomes significant and
in line with our expectation. In the first column of Table 6, the coefficients to FisDecPit × PolExpit and
FisDecPit ×WelExpit are negative, which indicates the beneficial effect raises the X-efficiencies in both
kinds of public spending, and dominates the harmful externality. The coefficient to FisDecPit×PolExpit is
-3.2020, which means a rise in FisDecPit by one unit can lead to a fall in the crime rate by 0.19% on average
only by raising the X-efficiency of police expenditure. Similarly, the coefficient of FisDecPit ×WelExpit
is -0.3170, which indicates the beneficial effect of decentralization is 0.23% on average by raising the
X-efficiency of welfare system.
Column 2 and 3 report the estimation for property crime and violent crime, respectively. The co-
efficients to both FisDecPit × PolExpit and FisDecPit ×WelExpit in column 2 are negative, but the
former one is not significant. In Column 3, the coefficients to the variables of our primary interest are both
negative and significant at the 1% level. After solving the multi-collinearity problem, the significance of
estimation is improved, and the beneficial effects of decentralization on both kinds of crime are apparent
to observe. Moreover, the magnitude of coefficients is larger for violent crime than property one, since the
harmful externality offsets the beneficial externality for the mobile crime.
For further robustness check, we estimate the effect of fiscal decentralization on six sub-categories
of crime by the specification in Table 6. Murder, forcible rape and robbery are typical violent crimes,
burglary, larceny theft and vehicle theft are property-related crimes. The results are shown in Table 7.
The coefficients to FisDecPit × PolExpit for all kinds of crime are negative, and only insignificant for
burglary and vehicle theft. The estimated parameters to FisDecPit × WelExpit are almost negative,
except that for robbery, and the significances are not sufficient in the regression of rape, burglary and
vehicle theft. The total effect of fiscal decentralization on each kind of crime is negative, even for robbery,
since the effect of decentralization in policing is much larger than that in welfare projects. Similar to
the results in Table 5, the different effect on violent crime and property crime, which is found in Figure
1, can be observed in police decentralization, rather than welfare decentralization. The coefficient to
FisDecPit × PolExpit for murder is -9.3470, that for rape is -9.6400 and it is -6.8050 for robbery. All
the three coefficients are significant at the 1% level. In contrast to property crime, only the coefficient for
larceny theft is significant, and the magnitude is -7.3350, which is not different from the smallest coefficient
18It means we only focus on the impact of decentralization on crime control through raising the X-efficiency.
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for violent crime. So the beneficial effect of police decentralization is generally larger for violent crime than
property one.
As a final test for robustness, we employ FisDecG as measure of fiscal decentralization to re-estimate
the impact. The results are shown in Table A3. The specification in the first two columns follow the one in
Table 4. The coefficients to FisDecG are both negative and significant for violent crime and property crime.
The only concern is the difference in magnitudes for the two coefficients is not so significant. The third and
fourth columns follow the regression in Table 5, the estimated parameters to all the three variables in which
we are interested are negative for violent crime and property crime, although that to FisDecG for violent
crime and FisDecGit×PolExpit for property crime are insignificant. The difference in the beneficial effect
on violent and property crime is easy to capture for both interaction terms. Column 5 and 6 report the
results of the regression which follows the one in Table 6. The coefficients to FisDecGit × PolExpit and
FisDecGit ×WelExpit are significantly negative for both violent and property crime. Therefore, fiscal
decentralization can help in reducing crime by raising the X-efficiency of police expenditure and welfare
expenditure. The coefficients for both interaction terms are larger for violent crime than property crime,
which could be interpreted as the harmful externality to the property crime.
In summary, the estimation results suggest that the fiscal decentralization could lower the crime rate,
the conclusion applies to total crime, property crime, violent crime and all sub-categories of crime. Due
to the externality to property crime control, the beneficial impact of decentralization is in general lower
for the property crime than the violent one, the pattern is robust when we estimate the effect on six
sub-categories of crime. In particular, the difference between violent and property crime is easy to observe
in the decentralization of police expenditure, since the welfare expenditure is hard to be specific to certain
types of criminals.
5.2 Transmission Channels of Decentralization Effect
As illustrated in our theoretical analysis, the estimation results also help to empirically prove the
existence of fiscal externality and crime control externality. Since there is no crime control externality to
the immobile crime, which is mainly violent crime, the effect of decentralization on violent crime could be
totally taken as the impact of fiscal externality. So if the estimated parameter is negative, the result could
be taken as evidence to the fiscal externality, and the magnitude of the coefficient could measure the size
of such an externality. Moreover, since the crime control externality only affects the property crime, if the
coefficient to FisDecPit is smaller for property crime than violent crime, the evidence of such externality
is found in empirics, and the difference between the two coefficients could be taken as the measure of
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the crime control externality. In addition, the fiscal externality and crime control externality could be
more significant to observe in the police decentralization, since the welfare expenditure is hard to aim at
reducing certain kind of crime, then the two effects are difficult to be identified in welfare decentralization.
The descriptive statistics have provided the preliminary evidence to the fiscal externality and crime
control externality. Table 4 formally tests it in a dynamic linear model. The coefficient to FisDecPit
is negative for violent crime, which provides evidence to the competition effect. The beneficial effect on
violent crime control is larger than that on property crime. The result offers the empirical support to the
existence of a crime control externality. The smaller coefficient for property crime also indicates in total
the crime control externality generates a harmful impact on crime control, that is, the displacement effect
is dominated by the free riding effect and cost inefficiency.
The effects of fiscal externality and crime control externality can be further captured in Table 6. The
coefficient to FisDecPit×PolExpit for violent crime is -4.6560, and that for property crime is -2.0090. The
negative parameter for violent crime proves the existence of fiscal externality in raising the X-efficiency
of police expenditure, and the difference between the two coefficients measures the effect of crime control
externality on that.
Based on the results in Table 4, the fiscal externality created by fiscal decentralization, including both
police and welfare decentralization, is measured by the coefficient to FisDecPit for violent crime, that is,
-5.5920. The crime control externality is measured as the difference between coefficients, that is, 3.6380.
It means, ceteris paribus, the fiscal decentralization increases by one unit, the crime rate will decrease by
5.59% because of the fiscal competition. Simultaneously, the externality in crime control will increase the
crime rate by 3.64%.
6 Conclusion
By far, let us look back to the questions raised in the beginning of the paper. What are the empirical
findings about the impact of fiscal decentralization on the crime rate? Based on the findings reported
above, we conclude that fiscal decentralization can lower the crime rate and promote public safety. We
have examined the effect on total crime, violent crime and property crime. The result indicates that the
crime rate is strongly lowered in the process of decentralization. Furthermore, the crime reduction effect
of fiscal decentralization is larger to immobile crime than mobile crime, the estimation is robust when we
use alternative measures of decentralization, and change the dependent variable to six sub-categories of
crime. Based on the estimation, how can we explain all the empirical findings?
We mainly interpret the effect by two kinds of externalities: fiscal externality and crime control ex-
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ternality. In a decentralized setting, the fiscal competition motivates local governments to raise the size
and X-efficiency of public expenditure, so that improves the public security. However, the crime control
externality, such as cost inefficiency in mobile crime control and free riding problem, might offset the
impact of decentralization through competition. Then, the beneficial effect of fiscal decentralization on
violent crime is larger than property crime, since property crime is more mobile, and suffers more from
harmful externality in mobile crime control. That is why the difference in beneficial impact could be
clearly observed in our estimation, and the results provide strong evidence to the fiscal externality and
crime control externality in the fiscal decentralization.
Our main results bear important policy implications. Policymaker could take the fiscal decentralization
as an efficient policy tool to promote public safety. When the fiscal system, especially the police and welfare
system, is decentralized, jurisdictional competition can be introduced, and the crime rate can be better
controlled. However, some externalities can also occur, especially to the mobile crime control. So the
policymaker has to be careful about the “dark” side of fiscal decentralization, and the coordination in
police and welfare policy between local governments is important to the success of such policy experiment.
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Table 1: Coefficients of Variation to Each Index
Panel Data Cross Section Time Series
FisDecP Means 0.2425 0.243 0.2425
Standard Deviation 0.4379 0.442 0.0087
Coefficient of variation 1.8057 1.823 0.0358
Min 0.0071 0.0095 0.2282
Max 2.6856 2.6282 0.2581
FisDecG Means 0.0075 0.0075 0.0075
Standard Deviation 0.0144 0.0140 0.002
Coefficient of variation 1.9180 1.8643 0.2426
Min 0.0002 0.0002 0.0057
Max 0.1225 0.0843 0.0109
FisDecL Means 0.0167 0.0167 0.0167
Standard Deviation 0.0156 0.0157 0.0000
Coefficient of variation 0.9316 0.9409 0.0006
Min 0.0002 0.0002 0.0167
Max 0.0650 0.0650 0.0168
Table 2: Average Crime Rate by High and Low Fiscal Decentralization
FisDecP FisDecP FisDecG FisDecG FisDecL FisDecL
<0.1 >0.1 <0.005 >0.005 <0.01 >0.01
TotCri 0.0466 0.0392 0.0439 0.0404 0.0468 0.0389
VioCri 0.0057 0.0038 0.0052 0.0039 0.0051 0.0041
ProCri 0.0410 0.0353 0.0388 0.0364 0.0418 0.0346
Observations 413 547 534 426 424 536
29
Table 3: Effect of Fiscal Decentralization on Total Crime Rate
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)
TotCri it−1 0.9430*** 0.6960*** 0.5380***
(0.00484) (0.0284) (0.0476)




















Arellano-Bond test -3.4318 -2.7492 -1.7558
P-value 0.0006 0.0060 0.0791
Sargan test 47.9594 45.1841 40.9179
P-value 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Instrumental Variables 172 146 129
Observations 816 480 302
Standard errors in parentheses










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5: Effect of Fiscal Decentralization on Crime (with interaction term)
(1) (2) (3)







FisDecP it -2.9420*** -1.3740 -6.4080***
(0.8190) (0.8560) (1.1540)
PolExpit -0.8880 -1.7690** -2.1360*
(0.7760) (0.8440) (1.1600)
FisDecP it×PolExpit -1.7830* -2.4220* -3.1000**
(1.0780) (1.3290) (1.5200)
WelExpit -0.1330** -0.1560*** 0.0260
(0.0559) (0.0407) (0.0591)
FisDecP it×WelExpit -0.0581 -0.2020** 0.0767
(0.1390) (0.0906) (0.1890)
Prisonerpcit -21.1000* -25.2300** -35.6500**
(12.0600) (12.3000) (15.3000)
Incpcit -0.2990*** -0.2250*** -0.2920***
(0.0382) (0.0357) (0.0538)
Unempit -0.0009 0.0051*** 0.0031
(0.0024) (0.0015) (0.0028)
Poverty it 0.0025*** -0.0015** 0.0056***
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0012)
Educit 0.0000 -0.0044*** -0.0081***
(0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0014)
Divorceit 0.0238*** 0.0315*** 0.0009
(0.0030) (0.0044) (0.0042)
IncTax it 0.0064* 0.0288*** 0.0203***
(0.0037) (0.0057) (0.0021)
Arellano-Bond test -1.8273 -1.7406 -1.1509
P-value 0.0677 0.0818 0.2498
Sargan test 42.404 36.9762 34.7565
P-value 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Instrumental Variables 131 131 131
Observations 302 302 302
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: Effect of Fiscal Decentralization on Crime (only interaction term)
(1) (2) (3)







WelExpit -0.0409 -0.1280*** 0.0472
(0.0380) (0.0373) (0.0507)
FisDecP it×WelExpit -0.3170*** -0.2370*** -0.2850***
(0.0765) (0.0916) (0.1010)
PolExpit -1.3940* -2.1690*** -0.7390
(0.7660) (0.8050) (0.8710)
FisDecP it×PolExpit -3.2020*** -2.0090 -4.6560***
(1.1520) (1.2980) (0.9950)
Prisonerpcit -18.0500** -13.8300 -3.6280
(8.5060) (9.8590) (11.8200)
Incpcit -0.2570*** -0.2100*** -0.1190***
(0.0313) (0.0345) (0.0442)
Unempit -0.0008 0.0058*** 0.0039
(0.0024) (0.0015) (0.0026)
Poverty it 0.0025*** -0.0016** 0.0066***
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0012)
Educit 0.0002 -0.0046*** -0.0062***
(0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0012)
Divorceit 0.0225*** 0.0334*** 0.0012
(0.0023) (0.0041) (0.0041)
IncTax it 0.0001 0.0275*** 0.0176***
(0.0036) (0.0057) (0.0024)
Arellano-Bond test -1.5677 -1.7564 -1.1598
P-value 0.1169 0.0790 0.2461
Sargan test 40.2339 39.4428 40.0963
P-value 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Instrumental Variables 130 130 130
Observations 302 302 302
Standard errors in parentheses











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A5: Coefficient of Variation for FisDecP
State Means St.Dev Coef.Var Min Max
AL 0.1004 0.0024 0.0238 0.0963 0.1054
AR 0.1854 0.0083 0.0448 0.1733 0.2024
AZ 0.0171 0.0024 0.1421 0.0142 0.0220
CA 0.0139 0.0006 0.0458 0.0129 0.0149
CO 0.0632 0.0065 0.1031 0.0543 0.0761
CT 0.0522 0.0013 0.0244 0.0503 0.0539
DE 0.0723 0.0057 0.0788 0.0639 0.0820
FL 0.0247 0.0021 0.0851 0.0220 0.0286
GA 0.0655 0.0073 0.1112 0.0556 0.0786
IA 0.3247 0.0074 0.0228 0.3122 0.3378
ID 0.1537 0.0169 0.1101 0.1287 0.1857
IL 0.2204 0.0057 0.0259 0.2134 0.2322
IN 0.2590 0.0102 0.0393 0.2438 0.2774
KS 0.7340 0.0293 0.0399 0.6971 0.7819
KY 0.1061 0.0058 0.0551 0.0971 0.1155
LA 0.0682 0.0012 0.0181 0.0660 0.0702
MA 0.0557 0.0014 0.0243 0.0539 0.0582
MD 0.0293 0.0013 0.0445 0.0274 0.0315
ME 0.3813 0.0108 0.0283 0.3668 0.3956
MI 0.1800 0.0035 0.0192 0.1765 0.1874
MN 0.5397 0.0285 0.0527 0.5003 0.5910
MO 0.2252 0.0090 0.0400 0.2120 0.2409
MS 0.1047 0.0035 0.0337 0.1000 0.1121
MT 0.1416 0.0064 0.0451 0.1311 0.1550
NC 0.0657 0.0049 0.0745 0.0580 0.0748
ND 2.6282 0.0430 0.0164 2.5219 2.6856
NE 0.5746 0.0214 0.0372 0.5428 0.6118
NH 0.1901 0.0109 0.0572 0.1778 0.2093
NJ 0.0676 0.0024 0.0354 0.0646 0.0719
NM 0.0546 0.0032 0.0587 0.0496 0.0614
NV 0.0095 0.0020 0.2060 0.0071 0.0133
NY 0.0819 0.0015 0.0183 0.0801 0.0848
OH 0.1985 0.0029 0.0147 0.1948 0.2045
OK 0.1711 0.0067 0.0390 0.1598 0.1826
OR 0.0703 0.0049 0.0694 0.0635 0.0799
PA 0.2082 0.0031 0.0151 0.2023 0.2133
RI 0.0374 0.0008 0.0210 0.0363 0.0385
SC 0.0666 0.0049 0.0740 0.0584 0.0743
SD 1.6607 0.0805 0.0485 1.5178 1.7943
TN 0.0606 0.0035 0.0571 0.0550 0.0671
TX 0.0566 0.0052 0.0915 0.0487 0.0659
UT 0.1038 0.0101 0.0971 0.0889 0.1241
VA 0.0322 0.0022 0.0692 0.0289 0.0359
VT 0.4707 0.0161 0.0343 0.4513 0.5011
WA 0.0466 0.0027 0.0589 0.0421 0.0519
WI 0.3443 0.0126 0.0366 0.3265 0.3679
WV 0.1277 0.0011 0.0088 0.1256 0.1296
WY 0.1946 0.0080 0.0409 0.1768 0.2080
Avearge 0.2425
Standard Deviation 0.4420
Coefficient of Variation 1.8226
Min 0.0095
Max 2.6282
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